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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 Gemini Physical Therapy and Rehabilitation, Inc. 
("Gemini") is a health care provider who treated various 
 
 
individuals who were injured in automobile accidents and insured 
by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm").  
Gemini and other health care providers who are no longer parties 
to this action ("the plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
1
  
The plaintiffs claimed to be the assignees of the insureds' 
rights under their automobile insurance policies, and alleged 
that State Farm unreasonably refused to pay the insureds' bills 
in full in violation of the insureds' contracts and the 
Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 Pa. 
C.S. § 1701 et seq. ("MVFRL").  The complaint sought payment in 
full, compensatory and punitive damages for tortious interference 
with contractual relations, and punitive damages pursuant to 42 
Pa. C.S. § 8371.    
 State Farm filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims 
for punitive damages under 42 Pa. C.S.A § 8371 and for 
intentional interference with contractual relations, which the 
district court granted.  The plaintiffs subsequently filed a 
first amended complaint which included new claims pursuant to the 
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 
73 P.S. §§ 201-1, et seq. ("CPL").  The district court granted 
State Farm's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' CPL claims for 
lack of standing.  
                     
1
.   The district court dismissed the claims of certain 
plaintiffs for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and dismissed 
the other claims without prejudice for misjoinder.  
 
 
 Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint.  State 
Farm filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking 
dismissal of all breach of contract claims under the MVFRL for 
reimbursement of medical bills submitted to State Farm after 
April 15, 1990, because of plaintiffs' alleged failure to exhaust 
their remedies under the MVFRL.  The district court denied the 
motion.  State Farm renewed its motion for partial summary 
judgment in light of a recent Pennsylvania Superior Court 
decision in Terminato v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Ins. Co., 618 A.2d 
1032 (Pa. Super. 1993), rev'd and remanded 645 A.2d 1287 (Pa. 
1994).  The district court granted the motion and dismissed all 
claims for reimbursement of medical bills submitted to State Farm 
after April 15, 1990.   
 In a bifurcated trial, the jury returned a verdict in 
favor of State Farm, finding that none of the treatment rendered 
by Gemini to the State Farm insureds was medically necessary.  
The district court denied Gemini's motion for a new trial.  
Gemini filed a timely appeal from those parts of the district 
court's orders dismissing Gemini's claim for punitive damages and 
intentional interference with contract claims, dismissing its 
claim under the CPL, and granting partial summary judgment for 
State Farm.  We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
 I. 
 As a preliminary matter, State Farm concedes that in 
light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Terminato v. Pennsylvania Nat'l. Ins. Co, 645 A.2d 1287 (Pa. 
1994), the order of the district court granting State Farm's 
 
 
motion for partial summary judgement must be vacated.  In 
Terminato, the court held that exhaustion of Peer Review 
Organization procedures under the MVFRL is not a prerequisite of 
bringing suit in a court of law for nonpayment of medical bills.  
Therefore, we will remand this case for a trial on Gemini's 
breach of contract claims under the MVFRL for reimbursement of 
medical bills submitted to State Farm after April 15, 1990. 
 II 
 Gemini's challenges primarily involve legal 
determinations by the district court, and therefore we exercise 
plenary review.  See Louis W. Epstein Family Partnership v. KMart 
Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 766 (3d Cir. 1994).    Gemini first argues 
that it has a valid claim under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. §§ 201-1, et seq.  
The CPL provides in pertinent part: 
 Any person who purchases or leases goods or 
services primarily for personal, family or 
household purposes and thereby suffers any 
ascertainable loss of money or property, real 
or personal, as a result of the use or 
employment by any person of [unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices] may bring a 
private action, to recover [damages]. 
 
73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a).   
 The district court dismissed Gemini's claims under the 
CPL because it lacked standing.  The court reasoned that Gemini, 
a provider of health care to purchasers of insurance policies, is 
not a member of the class protected by the statute.  It rejected 
Gemini's argument that it has standing by virtue of its status as 
assignee under the insurance policies.  The court held that 
 
 
Gemini is only an assignee of the limited right to receive 
payment under the policies.  
 The CPL contemplates as the protected class only those 
who purchase goods or services, not those who may receive a 
benefit from the purchase.  See Zerpol Corp. v. DMP Corp., 561 F. 
Supp. 404, 415 (E.D.Pa. 1983) (dismissing corporate plaintiff's 
claim because private cause of action under the CPL is limited to 
purchasers or lessors of goods used primarily for personal, 
family, or household purposes).  Accord Klitzner Industries Inc. 
v. H.K. James & Co., 535 F. Supp. 1249, 1258 (E.D.Pa. 1982); 
Permagrain Products, Inc. v. U.S. Mat & Rubber Co., 489 F. Supp. 
108, 111 (E.D.Pa. 1980).  Although Gemini may have been 
indirectly injured, it is not a purchaser or consumer of goods or 
services under the CPL and therefore has no private right of 
action under the statute. 
 Gemini relies on Hedlund Manufacturing Company v. 
Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 539 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1988) in support for 
its argument that the insureds' CPL claims are assignable.  In 
Hedlund, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged 
Pennsylvania's well-established policy of permitting causes of 
actions to be assigned and held that a claim for damages based 
upon legal malpractice is assignable.  This case is 
distinguishable for two reasons.  First, Gemini has sued under a 
specific statute intended to restrict fraud against consumers.  
However, Gemini is a commercial purchaser of the insureds' 
claims; its complaint does not allege that it is a purchaser or 
consumer of goods or services from State Farm.  Second, in 
 
 
Hedlund, the assignor expressly "assigned all rights and causes 
of action" pursuant to a patent application.  Id. at 358.  Here, 
the complaint alleges that the patients assigned only their 
rights under their insurance contracts.  It does not follow 
consequentially that the patients also assigned their rights to 
bring suits under the CPL.  Because the CPL focuses narrowly on 
the protection of consumers in the purchase of goods or services, 
we predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not infer an 
assignment of claims under the CPL.  Accordingly, we perceive no 
error in the district court's holding that Gemini lacks standing 
to bring an action against State Farm under the CPL. 
 III. 
 Next, Gemini challenges the district court's dismissal 
of its claim for intentional interference with contractual 
relations brought pursuant to section 766A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.
2
  In contrast to section 766 of the 
Restatement,
3
 which has been adopted by Pennsylvania, a party is 
                     
2
.   Section 766A provides: 
 One who intentionally and improperly 
interferes with the performance of a contract 
. . . between another and a third person, by 
preventing the other from performing the 
contract or causing his performance to be 
more expensive or burdensome, is subject to 
liability to the other for the pecuniary loss 
resulting to him. 
3
.   Section 766 provides: 
 One who intentionally and improperly 
interferes with the performance of a contract 
. . . between another and a third person by 
inducing or otherwise causing the third 
person not to perform the contract, is 
subject to liability to the other for the 
 
 
liable under section 766A for merely making a third party's 
performance of his contract with another party more expensive or 
burdensome.  As this court stated in its careful analysis of the 
two sections in Windsor Secur., Inc. v. Hartford Life Insurance 
Co., 986 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1993), "[s]ection 766 addresses 
disruptions caused by an act directed not at the plaintiff, but 
at a third person:  the defendant causes the promisor to breach 
its contract with the plaintiff.  Section 766A addresses 
disruptions caused by an act directed at the plaintiff:  the 
defendant prevents or impedes the plaintiff's own performance."  
Id. at 660.  Not only are the targets of the two sections 
different, but section 766A is much more difficult to apply and 
conducive to disputes. 
 In Price v. Sorrell, 784 P.2d 614 (Wyo. 1989), quoted 
in Windsor, 986 F.2d at 661, n.10, the Supreme Court of Wyoming 
directly faced the application of section 766A of the 
Restatement:  the defendant's interference made the plaintiff's 
performance of a contract more costly.  Although the court had 
previously adopted §§ 766 and 766B of the Restatement, it refused 
to adopt § 766A.  It reasoned, and we agree, that causing 
performance of a contract to be more costly "as an element of 
proof is too speculative and subject to abuse to provide a 
meaningful basis for a cause of action."  784 P.2d at 616.  Thus, 
(..continued) 
pecuniary loss resulting to the other from 





we are not persuaded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
adopt section 766A, and we see no error in the district court's 
dismissal of Gemini's section 766A claim. 
 IV. 
 Gemini also contends that it has a valid claim for 
punitive damages under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371.  Section 8371 
provides: 
 In an action arising under an insurance 
policy, if the court finds that the insurer 
has acted in bad faith toward the insured, 
the court may take all of the following 
actions: 
  
  (1) Award interest on the amount of 
the claim from the date the claim 
was made . . . . 
 
  (2) Award punitive damages against the 
insurer. 
 
  (3) Assess court costs and attorney fees 
against the insurer. 
 
42 Pa. C.S. § 8371.  The district court dismissed Gemini's 
section 8371 claim, reasoning that the Pennsylvania legislature 
intended the MVFRL, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1797, to provide the exclusive 
first party remedy for bad faith denials by insurance companies 
with respect to claims arising out of automobile accident 
injuries. 
 In Barnum v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 635 
A.2d 155 (Pa. Super. 1993), the court held that the provisions of 
section 1797, and not section 8371, are to be applied to claims 
for first party benefits under the MVFRL.  Relying on the 
Pennsylvania statute controlling statutory construction, 1 
 
 
Pa.C.S. § 1933, the court noted that the two statutory provisions 
cannot be reconciled because the damages in the event of wanton 
or bad faith conduct and the rates of interest specified by each 
are different.  Barnum, 635 A.2d at 158.  Moreover, the 
procedures and remedies under section 1797 are set forth with 
specificity.  Id.  The court concluded that because the two 
provisions were enacted at the same time and cannot be 
reconciled, the specific provisions of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1797 must be 
deemed an exception to the general remedy for bad faith contained 
in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371.  Id. at 159 (citing supporting district 
court cases).  We find this statutory construction to be 
convincing and predict the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
similarly rule on this matter.  Thus, the district court did not 
err in dismissing Gemini's claim brought under 42 Pa. C.S. § 
8371.   
 Finally, Gemini raises several issues pertaining to the 
evidentiary admission of expert testimony, settlement 
discussions, and rebuttal witnesses.  We summarily reject these 
arguments as lacking merit. 
   V. 
 The district court's grant of partial summary judgement 
in favor of State Farm must be reversed in light of Terminato.  
Accordingly, we will remand this matter for a new trial as to 
Gemini's claims for reimbursement of medical bills submitted to 
State Farm after April 15, 1990.  In all other respects, the 
orders of the district court will be affirmed.  Three-fourths of 
the costs to be taxed against Gemini. 
 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
 
 
